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Abstract
We propose a new welfare criterion that allows us to rank alternative
financial market structures in the presence of belief heterogeneity. We
analyze economies with complete and incomplete financial markets
and/or restricted trading possibilities in the form of borrowing limits
or transaction costs. We describe circumstances under which various
restrictions on financial markets are desirable according to our welfare
criterion.
Keywords: social welfare, heterogeneous beliefs, spurious unanimity,
speculation, pessimism, incomplete markets, financial regulation
1 Introduction
A conventional wisdom in the economics profession is that complete markets
are good. The welfare theorems state that complete markets outcomes are
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Pareto optimal and that any optimal allocation can be realized by trade in
complete markets with an appropriate lump-sum transfer scheme. So putting
limits on trade, by foreclosing trading opportunities, leaves potential mutual
gains unrealized. This “wisdom” has practical consequences. Arguments
for the privatization of social security and against the regulation of financial
markets rely in part on the assertion that barriers to trade are bad things.
Complete markets have their critics. Some say that traders have market
power and that their exploitation can be limited only by constraining trade.
Others argue that market outcomes, though optimal, are bad in other ways;
since lump-sum transfers are impossible, the sacrifice of dead-weight loss is
necessary to achieve other goals. These critiques are empirical. The degree of
market power could be large or small. Lump-sum transfers are not so much
impossible as they are difficult to execute. Consequently, these concerns are
typically considered to be second-order.
We offer here a different and perhaps more fundamental critique. When
markets allocate contingent claims among expected-utility-maximizing agents,
Pareto optimality with ex ante beliefs is an inappropriate welfare criterion
except in the instance where all traders have identical beliefs over states of
the world. This critique is detailed in section 3, after an infinite-horizon
model of trade in a single consumption good with complete markets is de-
veloped in section 2. If the “true distribution of states” were known to an
omniscient social planner, Pareto calculations with correct beliefs is an ob-
vious fix. Omniscient social planners are rare, however, and without them
there is no alternative welfare requirement that obviously ameliorates the
issues raised in section 3. We investigate the magnitude of the problem
through simulations of competitive equilibria. The simulations of sections 5,
6 and 7 examine several policy alternatives to complete markets in Marko-
vian instances of the model of financial restrictions developed in section 4,
and explore the size and location of the set of potentially true distributions
for which the policies would lead to a true welfare improvement with respect
to several distinct welfare criteria. We conclude in section 8 with a discussion
of the theoretical and the policy implications of our findings.
2 The model
We assume that time is discrete and begins at date 0. At each date a state is
drawn from the set S = {1, . . . , S}. The set of all sequences of states is Σ with
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representative sequence σ = (s0, s1, ...), called a path. Let σ
t = (s0, ..., st)
denote the partial history through date t. We use σ˜|σt to indicate that a
path σ˜ coincides with a path σ up through period t.
The set Σ together with its product sigma-field is the measurable space on
which everything is built. Let P 0 denote the “true” probability measure on
Σ. For any probability measure P on Σ, Pt(σ) is the (marginal) probability
of the partial history σt: Pt(σ) = P ({σt} × S × S × · · · ).
In the next few paragraphs we introduce a number of random variables
of the form xt(σ). All such random variables are assumed to be date-t mea-
surable; that is, their value depends only on the realization of states through
date t. Formally, Ft is the σ-field of events measurable at date t, and each
xt(σ) is assumed to be Ft-measurable.
An economy contains I consumers, each with consumption set R+. A
consumption plan c : Σ → ∏∞t=0 R+ is a sequence of R+-valued functions
{ct(σ)}∞t=0 in which each ct is Ft-measurable. Each consumer is endowed
with a particular consumption plan, called the endowment stream. Consumer
i’s endowment stream is denoted ei. The aggregate endowment stream is
denoted by e¯:
e¯t(σ) =
I∑
i=1
eit(σ).
An allocation is a profile of consumption plans, one for each individual. The
allocation (c1, . . . , cI) is feasible if for all σ and t,
∑
i c
i
t(σ)− eit(σ) = 0.
Consumer i’s preferences on consumption plans are described by a belief
or forecast distribution P i, a probability distribution on Σ, a discount factor
0 < βi < 1, and a payoff function ui : R++ → R. The utility consumer i
assigns to consumption plan c is the expectation of the average discounted
value of the sequence of payoff realizations:
U iP i(c) = (1− βi)EP i
{
∞∑
t=0
βtiui(ct(σ))
}
. (1)
Notice that beliefs are indexed by individual names. Different individuals
may believe different things about the future, and these beliefs need not
coincide with what will actually happen. The true state process is a stochastic
process on S, characterized by a probability distribution P 0 on Σ, and it may
be the case that for no distinct i, j ≥ 0 does P i = P j. We will impose some
constraints on how different beliefs can be.
We assume the following properties of the payoff function:
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A1. Each ui : R++ → (−∞,∞) is C1, strictly increasing and strictly con-
cave.
A2. Each ui satisfies an Inada condition at 0: limc↓0 u
′
i(c) =∞.
We assume the following properties of the aggregate endowment:
A3. The aggregate endowment is uniformly bounded from above and away
from 0:
∞ > F = sup
t,σ
e¯t(σ) > inf
t,σ
e¯t(σ) = f > 0.
Finally, we assume that anything is possible at any date, and that indi-
viduals believe this to be true:
A 4. For all individuals i, all dates t and all paths σ, the distributions
P it (st|σt−1) for i ≥ 0 have full support.
We will often refer to agents as being optimistic or pessimistic. We say
that a type-i agent is optimistic after history σt if Ei[eit+1|σt] > E0[eit+1|σt].
Pessimism is defined analogously.
3 Welfare economics of heterogeneous beliefs
The welfare analysis of market outcomes begins with the Pareto order, taking
preferences as given. “Tastes,” say Stigler and Becker [1977, p. 76], “are the
unchallengeable axioms of a man’s behavior: he may properly (usefully) be
criticized for inefficiency in satisfying his desires, but the desires themselves
are data.” Tastes, they say, “are not capable of being changed by persuasion.”
In contingent-claims markets, “Pareto optimality” is taken to be with
respect to ex ante preferences (tastes); that is, ex ante, or time-0, expected
utility. While we do certainly agree that tastes for apples and oranges, work
and leisure, etc., are to be taken as given, we dispute the claim that ex ante
preferences on contingent claims are above dispute. Time-separable expected
utility representations of these preferences have three components: attitudes
towards risk, the rate of time preference, and beliefs about the realization
of states. While risk attitudes and discount factors may be unarguable,
beliefs are not. When market participants have different beliefs, not all can
be right, and those who are wrong are making decisions that they would
regard as incorrect if only they had correct beliefs. Finally, if beliefs were
4
an indisputable attribute of tastes there would be no role for expectation-
managing policies, and the rational expectations hypothesis would never be
conceived.1
3.1 Spurious unanimity
Ithaca NY, the home of three of us, has a pedestrian mall. It is still ser-
viceable, but would benefit from renovation. The work, however, will be
costly. Suppose that half the town believes that revitalization will enhance
Ithaca’s attraction as a summer tourist destination. This group believes that
crowds of tourists will bring more business opportunities and badly needed
tax revenues. The other half of the town believes that revitalization will
make downtown more pleasant without materially perturbing downtown’s
summer population density, thereby enhancing the quality of life. The town
is unanimous in its support for the project. Is unanimity of preference a
good argument for undertaking the project? Not according to Mongin [2005],
who calls this problem “spurious unanimity”. He argues that not only pref-
erences themselves, but the reasons why people hold the preferences they
have, need to be considered in making welfare claims. This is clear in the
mall-renovation case. Suppose that many editorials have appeared in the lo-
cal newspaper, many public meetings have been held, and the issue has been
thoroughly aired. It is common knowledge, then, that individuals believe
different things. It is common knowledge, then, that if the mall is renovated,
half the town will be unhappy with the result. It is common knowledge that
the renovation cannot be an ex post Pareto improvement. There is disagree-
ment only over who is in which half. Suppose there are N different possible
states of the world rather than 2, and that the population is divided equally
into N groups. Individuals in any group will benefit from a proposal only
if “their” state of the world occurs and will be harmed otherwise, and each
individual is sure that the state beneficial to him will occur. It is then com-
mon knowledge that only fraction 1/N of the population will be made better
off, that fraction N − 1/N will be made worse off. Imagine that N is large.
The justification of the proposal by ex ante Pareto optimality is not at all
1The assumption of “common knowledge of prior beliefs” is often used, following Au-
mann [1976], to justify common beliefs. Common prior arguments are critically discussed
in Morris [1995]. To his analysis we add that the entire apparatus of belief about beliefs
about beliefs is simply misplaced in models of trade in large anonymous markets, wherein
one individual may have no idea of who or what is on the other side of his transaction.
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compelling.
The problem of spurious unanimity is even more compelling when ex-
pected utility decision makers choose over alternatives with random payoffs.
Imagine now that two decision-makers are choosing between two policies, A
and B. Policy A gives outcome a on event E and b on Ec. Policy B is the
mirror-image; it gives outcome b on E and a on Ec. Individuals 1 and 2 each
have a payoff function and a prior belief, which are as follows:
Individual 1 u1(a) = 1, u1(b) = 0, ρ1(E) = 0.99,
Individual 2 u2(a) = 0, u2(b) = 1, ρ1(E) = 0.01.
Each individual prefers policy A to policy B. Unanimity is a consequence of
their divergent beliefs. Given their payoff functions, if they shared a common
belief they could never agree on a policy except in the case where they both
believe each state is equally likely.
Of course, if one believes that all individuals have common, correct be-
liefs then spurious unanimity is not an issue and ex ante Pareto optimality
is an appropriate welfare criterion. We do not find this restriction on beliefs
compelling. It certainly does not follow from Savage’s (1954) subjective ex-
pected utility theorem. It is instead a restriction on preferences which goes
far beyond the notion of rationality embedded in Savage. In fact, even the
ability to reason about the probabilities in Savage’s representation as beliefs
is not as simple as is normally supposed. We discuss this issue in Appendix
A.1.
3.2 The ex ante welfare economics of contingent claims
Because beliefs are not above dispute, we are concerned with two Pareto
orders. The usual welfare analysis is concerned with the ex ante Pareto
order, and because individuals would choose to adopt the true distribution if
only they knew it, we are also concerned with the true Pareto order which is
the order that obtains when each individual computes expected utility with
the true distribution P0.
If individuals disagree, then in economies of the type described in Section
2, these two orders differ. That is, ex ante optimal contingent claims for
given beliefs P 1, . . . , P I , with P i 6= P j, for some i and j, cannot be true
Pareto optimal for any P 0.
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Proposition 1. If the economy contains two individuals i and j such that
for some t and some path σ, P it (σ) 6= P jt (σ), then no ex ante Pareto optimal
allocation in which ci, cj 6= 0 can be optimal for any true distribution P 0.
Proof. If P it (σ) 6= P jt (σ), then there must exist some other path σ′ such that
P it (σ
′)/P jt (σ
′) 6= P it (σ)/P jt (σ), else probabilities cannot sum to one. The
first-order conditions for optimality on path σ imply that
u′i
(
cit(σ)
)
u′j
(
cjt (σ)
) = λiβtj
λjβti
P jt (σ)
P it (σ)
,
where the λ’s, multipliers for the Pareto optimization problem, are both
positive as ci, cj 6= 0. Suppose now that the allocation is true Pareto optimal
for some P 0. Then first-order conditions imply that there will be positive
multipliers γi and γj such that
u′i
(
cit(σ)
)
u′j
(
cjt(σ)
) = γi
γj
βtj
βti
.
Consequently the vectors (γiβ
t
j, γjβ
t
i) and
(
λiβ
t
jP
j
t (σ), λjβ
t
iP
i
t (σ)
)
are propor-
tional.
Now consider path σ′. Since the allocation is truly optimal, it must be
the case that:
u′i
(
cit(σ
′)
)
u′j
(
cjt(σ
′)
) = γi
γj
βtj
βti
.
Since the allocation is also ex ante optimal:
u′i
(
cit(σ
′)
)
u′j
(
cjt(σ
′)
) = λiβtj
λjβti
P jt (σ
′)
P it (σ
′)
.
Thus P it (σ
′)/P jt (σ
′) = P it (σ)/P
j
t (σ), which is a contradiction.
When discount factors are identical, there is in fact a simple necessary
condition for true Pareto optimality: Everyone’s consumption is bounded
away from 0.
Corollary 1. If individuals have identical discount factors, if the allocation
c is true-Pareto optimal, and if for all i, ci 6= 0, then for each individual i
and all σ, lim inft c
i
t(σ) > 0.
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Proof. This follows immediately from the fact that the first order conditions
are independent of P 0, that the welfare weights are positive, and that aggre-
gate endowments are uniformly bounded above and below across paths.
Another necessary condition for true optimality is that there is no spec-
ulation on irrelevant states (frivolous uncertainty).
Corollary 2. Suppose that c is true-Pareto optimal, that ci 6= 0 for all i,
and that the endowment allocation at date t is constant on some event E,
that is, for σ, σ′ ∈ E, et(σ) = et(σ′). Then for all individuals cit(σ) = cit(σ′).
Proof. Since the allocation is true-Pareto optimal and ci 6= 0 for all i, it must
be the case that:
u′i
(
cit(σ)
)
uj
(
cjt(σ)
) = γi
γj
βtj
βti
=
u′i
(
cit(σ
′)
)
uj
(
cjt(σ
′)
) , ∀i, j.
Then et(σ) = et(σ
′) on E and the fact that the allocation c is feasible imply
the desired result.
Proposition 1 and the first welfare theorem suggest that the introduction
of some kind of market incompleteness could be welfare-improving, that is,
incomplete markets could yield allocations that true-Pareto dominate the
complete-markets allocation. Interestingly, someone whose beliefs are correct
cannot be ex ante hurt by any true-Pareto improvement. So, as long as
majority of the population have correct beliefs, proposals that are true-Pareto
improvements should gain political support.
Unfortunately, the mechanism design problem depends critically on the
true distribution P 0. It is easy to construct examples where there is no
allocation that true-Pareto dominates a given ex ante optimal allocation for
every possible P 0.2 Since individuals in the market do not have privileged
2Consider the following example. Two agents with logarithmic preferences believe that
the distribution over two possible states is (0.6,0.4) and (0.4,0.6), respectively. Agent i is
endowed with 1 − e units of consumption good in state i and e units otherwise. In the
competitive equilibrium (CE), consumption of agents 1 and 2 are (0.6,0.4) and (0.4,0.6).
The even split is the allocation in which the agents consume 0.5 in each state. It true Pareto
dominates the CE allocation only if the true distribution is sufficiently close to (0.5, 0.5). If
the probability of state 1 under the true distribution exceeds p¯1 ≡ ln(1.25)/ln(1.5)≈ 0.55
or is below 1−p¯1, then the even split no longer true-Pareto dominates the CE allocation. In
fact, in this case there is no other allocation that true-Pareto dominates the CE allocation
for all belief assignments.
8
knowledge of the true distribution, it would be unreasonable to assume that
market designers would have any better knowledge. That is, we want to do
distribution-independent market design.
Our solution to this problem is to explore the parameter space. We
show that there are market institutions that outperform complete markets
over much of the parameter space. “Outperform” here has three meanings.
For the market interventions we consider, through simulation we delineate
regions of the model’s parameter space where the intervention is true Pareto
superior, where it is better according to a Rawlsian welfare aggregator, and
where it is better according to a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function
where the welfare weights are those that solve the ex ante Pareto optimality
problem.
3.3 Spurious unanimity: other approaches
Others have addressed the problem of spurious unanimity in contingent
claims allocations. Brunnermeier et al. [forthcoming] introduce belief-neutral
Pareto optimality. They identify a set of “reasonable beliefs”, potential true
distributions, which is the convex hull of the set of individuals’ beliefs. Al-
location x is then belief-neutral Pareto superior to allocation y if x is true
Pareto superior to y for every true distribution in the set of reasonable beliefs.
The intersection of a collection of Pareto orders is, generally speaking, incred-
ibly incomplete. Brunnermeier et al. [forthcoming] reduce incompleteness by
examining partial orders induced by Bergson-Samuelson social welfare func-
tions, taking weighted averages of each profile of true expected utilities.
Gilboa et al. [2014] offer a somewhat complicated alternative. Allocation
x no-bet Pareto improves upon y if x ex ante Pareto improves upon y and
if there exists a potentially true probability distribution such that each indi-
vidual whose position is ex ante improved in the move from y to x also truly
prefers x to y. This is a direct attempt to remove from Paretian calculations
the speculative component to trade that is introduced when beliefs disagree.
The no-bet Pareto relation, while acyclic, can be intransitive.
These two proposals delineate the trade offs that arise when considering
potential true distributions. Requiring Pareto improvement with respect to a
large class of potential true distributions for all welfare comparisons thickens
the contract curve; few welfare comparisons can be made. Relaxing this
ordinal uniformity condition, however, and allowing different distributions
9
for different comparisons, will, generally speaking, introduce intransitivities.
Duffie [2014] also addresses the issue of trading generated by heteroge-
neous beliefs and appropriate policy responses to it. He raises issues of how to
evaluate welfare in this context and considers the tradeoffs between reducing
speculation and trading to hedge risk, provide liquidity or use information.
We do not see any particularly compelling way to undertake welfare anal-
ysis when beliefs are heterogeneous. This includes ex ante Pareto optimality.
So in this paper we carry out the more limited task of identifying sets of
beliefs and potentially true distributions for which given market restrictions
are in some sense welfare-improving in some simple examples. We believe
that if, in a carefully calibrated model of economic activity, for some market
restriction the set of potentially true distributions for which it is a welfare
improvement is large, then there is a strong prima facie case for introducing
it.
4 Financial markets, competitive equilibria
In this section, we describe optimization problems of an agent under different
financial market designs.
4.1 The complete markets economy
The first and the key market design is (dynamically) complete financial mar-
kets. Let Qt(σ) be the date-t price of an Arrow security that pays along path
σ. The number of Arrow securities purchased by a type-i agent in period t
along history σ is denoted by ait(σ). Then a type-i agent faces the following
budget constraint at each date t
cit(σ) +
∑
σ˜|σt
Qt(σ˜)a
i
t+1(σ˜) = a
i
t(σ) + e
i
t(σ). (2a)
Purchases of Arrow securities are subject to natural borrowing limits at each
date t
ait+1(σ) > −N it+1(σ), (2b)
constructed as follows. Define the j-period ahead priceQjt (σ) = Π
j−1
k=0Qt+k(σ).
Then a natural borrowing limit equals the date-t value of the continuation
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of an agent’s endowment plan:
N it (σ) =
∞∑
j=0
∑
σ˜|σt
Qjt (σ˜)e
i
t+j(σ˜). (3)
Natural borrowing limits never bind in a competitive equilibrium if a period
utility function satisfies our Inada condition (A2). A type-i agent chooses
consumption and asset trading plans to maximize life-time utility (1) subject
to constraints (2a) and (2b).
We define prices of two assets to which we refer later. The price of a
risk-free bond at date t is
qbt (σ) =
∑
σ˜|σt
Qt(σ˜). (4a)
The price at date t on path σ of a claim to the aggregate endowment is:
qet (σ) =
∞∑
j=0
∑
σ˜|σt
Qjt (σ˜)et+j(σ˜). (4b)
Definition. The complete financial markets (CM) design is a set of S finan-
cial markets where market j trades an Arrow security that pays one unit of
consumption good next period if state j realizes. Trading is subject to natural
borrowing limits defined above.
Definition. An agent is said to survive if his consumption remains strictly
positive forever almost surely-P 0.
In addition to standard complete markets, we analyze several other de-
signs: complete markets with borrowing limits (CMB), complete markets in
which transactions are taxed (CMT), and markets trading only a risk-free
bond subject to a borrowing limit (B). We think of these intermediate de-
signs as partially regulated financial markets and aim to shed light on the
relative desirability of different restrictions.
4.2 A bond economy
Definition. A bond-only financial market design (B) consists of a single mar-
ket that trades a risk-free bond subject to an exogenous borrowing limit.
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In the bond economy, a type-i agent faces the following constraints:
cit(σ) + q
b
t (σ)b
i
t+1(σ) = b
i
t(σ) + e
i
t(σ), (5a)
bit+1(σ) > −Bit+1(σ), (5b)
where qbt (σ) denotes the date-t price of a risk free bond, b
i
t(σ) represents the
date-t bond purchases of agent i, and Bit+1(σ) is an exogenous borrowing
limit. These borrowing limits have to be sufficiently tight to make sure that
all loans are repaid with certainty. Borrowing limits must be tighter than the
worst-case date-t value of the continuation of an agent-i’s endowment plan:
inf
σ˜|σt
[
eit(σ˜) +
∞∑
j=0
Πj−1k=0q
b
t+k(σ˜)e
i
t+1+j(σ˜)
]
.
The above borrowing limit is the largest limit that can (potentially) be im-
posed after history σt on a type-i agent in the bond-only economy. However,
unlike in the complete markets economy, an endogenous borrowing limit can-
not be determined before solving for a competitive equilibrium. Hence, an
exogenous borrowing limit must be imposed instead.
4.3 Borrowing limits
Definition. The complete financial markets with a borrowing limit (CMB)
design is a set of S financial markets where market j trades an Arrow security
that pays one unit of consumption good next period if state j realizes and zero
otherwise. Trading is subject to an exogenous borrowing limit.
Under the complete markets with a borrowing limit design trading is
subject to an exogenous borrowing limit B that is tighter than the natural
borrowing limits in (2b)
ait+1(σ) > −B. (6)
The financial markets are complete in the sense that a full set of Arrow
securities is traded. Yet, when a tight borrowing limit is imposed, insurance
possibilities are restricted. Speculation opportunities are also limited, which
tames the survival forces analyzed by Blume and Easley [2006] that otherwise
would drive the consumption of agents with less accurate beliefs to zero
asymptotically.
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4.4 Transaction costs
Definition. The complete financial markets with a transaction cost (CMT)
design is a set of S financial markets where market j trades an Arrow security
that pays one unit of consumption good next period if state j realizes and zero
otherwise. Trading is subject to a transaction cost.
Under this design the budget constraint (2a) is replaced with the following
cit(σ) +
∑
σ˜|σt
Qt(σ˜)a
i
t+1(σ˜) + τ ·
∑
σ˜|σt
[ait+1(σ˜)− ait(σ)]2
= ait(σ) + e
i
t(σ) + Tt(σ)/2, (7)
where Tt(σ) is the total transaction tax revenue. Our transaction tax design
embeds two important assumptions. First, the transaction tax is assumed to
be a quadratic function of security purchases to insure continuity of demands
for securities. Second, we rebate the transaction tax back to investors as equal
lump sums.
A transaction cost limits speculation opportunities, as does a borrowing
limit, but agents are not guaranteed to survive. The two alternatives differ
in how they control potential welfare losses: a transaction cost slows the rate
at which agents can lose wealth, and a borrowing limit imposes a bound on
how much wealth can be lost.
5 Welfare criteria
We require some welfare criterion in order to discuss the welfare consequences
of market restrictions. Although we do not want to commit to a particular
criterion, any acceptable criterion should satisfy some obvious desiderata.
First, as we have argued, it cannot be based on individual welfare computed
ex ante. We consider individuals who chose optimally, given their preferences,
but we evaluate their welfare using the true probability on states. Second, we
do not want to evaluate social welfare using any particular truth as we see no
justification for assuming that the social planner, who we view as choosing
market restrictions, knows the truth when individuals do not know it. So, we
evaluate welfare over a set of possible truths. Third, we do not want to design
market restrictions that work only for particular configurations of individual
beliefs. Once we drop the usual restriction that beliefs are correct, we see
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no justification for placing joint restrictions on, possibly incorrect, beliefs of
individuals. Therefore we evaluate welfare over a set of individual beliefs.
Finally, for any given individual beliefs and truth, we need to aggregate
individual payoffs. Here too we see no compelling argument for any partic-
ular aggregator and we instead consider several possibilities: one based on
a Rawlsian criterion as well as one based on a Bergson-Samuelson criterion.
We admit at the outset that this approach requires that we take utility to be
interpersonally comparable. The burgeoning literature on ex ante optimality
with heterogeneous beliefs has yet to produce a satisfactory ordinal way of
proceeding; so at the present time social welfare functions are the only way to
go forward. Definition. A utility aggregator W : RI → R is a non-decreasing
continuous function such that W(U) ∈ [mini Ui,maxi Ui], ∀U ∈ RI .
The Pareto welfare criterion uses:
W(U1, .., UI) =
I∑
i=1
θiUi (8)
for some exogenously given vector of Pareto weights θ ∈ ∆I . Another possi-
bility is the Rawlsian utility aggregator:
W(U) = min
i
Ui. (9)
Definition. Let B be a set of admissible beliefs and let P = (P 1, ..., P I) ∈
BI denote a belief assignment. Let P 0 ∈ B0 be a data generating process,
where B0 is a set of admissible data generating processes. Let c(P|M) be
a competitive equilibrium allocation under a financial market structure M
and a belief assignment P. Then the social welfare function using a utility
aggregator W is:
min
P 0∈B0
min
P∈BI
W
((
Ui,P 0(c
i(P|M))
)I
i=1
)
. (10)
This welfare criterion emerges from three analytic choices. The first choice
is that of W. Fix the beliefs assignment P = (P 1, ..., P I) and the true data
generating process P 0. By choosing a market structure M the designer
effectively selects an allocation (c1(P|M), ..., cI(P|M)) and the associated
distribution of utilities (U1,P 0, ..., UI,P 0). A utility aggregator W transforms
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the distribution of utilities into a social welfare measure. A designer using (9)
would choose a financial market structure that benefits the least-advantaged
members of society. That is the designer would adhere to one of the principles
of justice proposed in Rawls [1971].3 A designer using (8) would act similarly
to a Pareto planner. But the utility aggregator (8) presents a new degree of
arbitrariness: What weights should a designer use? One could choose θi =
1/I, ∀i, the choice that is attractive in ex-ante symmetric environments. One
could also choose θ to be a vector of “market weights”.4 These two choices
are special cases of Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions. However,
any set of weights is arbitrary. The paternalistic designer using the Rawlsian
aggregator (9) is spared the obligation of deciding a fair set of weights.
The second choice is the minimization over belief assignments. Our moti-
vation is that in reality many configurations of beliefs are possible. Each such
configuration may support a different financial market design. For example,
some agents may be optimistic and undertake excessively risky investments
that could drive them quickly out of financial markets. Imposing borrowing
limits may be desirable in this case. On the other hand, pessimistic agents
might over-invest in safe assets. They would still be driven out of finan-
cial markets, but perhaps at a slower rate. Financial regulation in this case
would have to strike a balance between saving agents from financial ruin
and encouraging diversification. A rational planner would need to take into
account any available information on the distribution of beliefs in the popu-
lation. We minimize over beliefs for two reasons. First, our goal in this paper
is to provide examples of how complete markets can go astray, and comput-
ing worst cases satisfies that need. Second, one can view minimization over
3Rawls [1971] argues that a fair social choice can only be made in a hypothetical
“original position”:
No one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does
anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities,
his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties
do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological
propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.
For our purposes, replace “principles of justice” with “design of financial markets.” The
veil of ignorance advocated by Rawls allows devising a set of rules that are independent
of the current economic fundamentals – beliefs assignment, true data generating process,
and wealth distribution.
4This is a vector of weights for which the Pareto and the competitive allocations coincide
under P i = P 0, ∀i. See section 7 for more details.
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belief assignments as a Rawlsian approach to social welfare in which each
belief assignment corresponds to a different feasible configuration of society
and the planner has no ex ante information about the beliefs held by the
traders.5
6 Examples
We now present the leading example that we use to illustrate economic forces
that operate in economies with heterogeneous beliefs. We apply our welfare
criterion to compare complete markets with various incomplete market set-
tings. In this section, we investigate social welfare using the Rawlsian utility
aggregator (9). In section 7, we consider the Pareto criterion using market
weights. The two criteria lead to remarkably similar results.
In our economy agents share a common utility function
u(c) = c1−γ/(1− γ),
where γ = 2.6 There are two types of agents and three states: σt ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
The economy begins in state 0 and then exits to states 1 and 2.7 Endowments
are
(e1t (σ), e
2
t (σ)) =


(0.5, 0.5) if σt = 0
(eh, el) if σt = 1
(el, eh) if σt = 2
, ∀t, σ. (11)
We assume that eh > el. Although there is no aggregate uncertainty, indi-
viduals face idiosyncratic risk.
Beliefs are specified as follows:
Πi =

 0 0.5 0.50 pi 1− pi
0 pi 1− pi

 , (12)
5Other approaches are possible. Phelan and Rustichini [2015], in a different context,
take an alternative approach in which each individual (for us each individual defined
by some beliefs) is treated a separate person and Pareto optimality takes each of these
“people” directly into account.
6Robustness of our results to the specification of preferences is considered in Appendix
A.3.
7The only purpose of the transitory state 0 is symmetry. It insures that agents begin
with identical endowments and can trade prior to the first realization of states 1 and 2.
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where Π0 denotes the true probability transition matrix. Subjective probabil-
ities over histories P it (σ) are computed using individual transition matrices.
8
6.1 Complete markets economy
First, we describe a competitive equilibrium in the complete markets economy
when beliefs are homogeneous, but not necessarily correct. Because there is
no aggregate uncertainty and preferences are homothetic, both agents con-
sume a constant amount. The competitive equilibrium allocation is:
(c1t (σ), c
2
t (σ)) = (0.5 + β
2(µe − 0.5), 0.5− β2(µe − 0.5)), ∀t, σ, (13)
where µe ≡ pel + (1 − p)eh is the expected endowment evaluated using the
common beliefs, p. An agent achieves a constant consumption plan by buying
an amount Aj ≡ 0.5 − ej + β(µe − 0.5) of Arrow securities paying in the
state where its income is ej . The quantity of Arrow securities traded in
equilibrium, |Aj |, is small relative to the natural borrowing limit: N it (σ) =
eit(σ) + βµe/(1− β).
Second, we describe a competitive equilibrium with complete markets and
heterogeneous beliefs. Suppose that p1 = p0 and p2 6= p0. In this case, not
only do agents not consume constant amounts, but as shown by Blume and
Easley [2006], consumption of a type-2 agent converges to zero:
lim sup
t→∞
c2t (σ) = 0 P
0a.s. (14)
Following Blume and Easley [2006], we say that type-2 agents do not survive.
The eventual immiseration of agents with incorrect beliefs when market are
complete is the source of an instinct that market restrictions could be useful.
Agents invest in Arrow securities for two reasons: income hedging and
disagreement. Suppose p2 > p0 = p1. To hedge income fluctuations, a type-2
8The beliefs on sample paths induced by this structure do not involve learning. Our
individuals believe that the exogenous states follow an iid process and each person i is cer-
tain about pi. The analysis can be extended to include learning. Our general results carry
over to this extension as can be seen from the analysis in Blume and Easley [2006]. Com-
puting equilibria is, however, much more difficult. Learning in which individuals’ beliefs
converge to the true data generating process makes complete markets more attractive, but
it does not eliminate the desirability of restrictions on financial markets. Individuals care
about the entire process, not just the limit, and so what matters is the speed of learning
versus the rate at which the future is discounted.
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Figure 1: Sample paths of consumption and financial wealth of a type-2 agent
in the complete markets economy.
Parameters: β = 0.96, el = 1/3, eh = 2/3, p
0 = p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.55.
agent buys Arrow securities that pay in state 1 (when his income is low) and
sells Arrow securities that pay in state 2 (when his income high). Because a
type-2 agent overestimates the probability of state 1, he buys extra securities
that pay in this state. So he over-invests in securities that pay in state 1
and under-invests in securities that pay in state 2. These additional trades
are “speculative.”9 As a result of these trades, a type-2 agent’s consumption
increases every time state 1 realizes. The opposite happens if state 2 realizes.
State 1 is less likely than a type-2 agent anticipates. So his investments pay
off less than he expects, he loses wealth on average, and his consumption
converges to zero.
Figure 1 plots 200 sample paths of consumption (panel A) and financial
wealth (panel B) of a type-2 agent for a simple example of the complete
markets economy. The solid line in each panel denotes the average across
sample paths. Both consumption and wealth drift towards their respective
lower bounds. The speed of convergence is slow: for example, after 100
periods a type-2 agent’s consumption decreases from 0.493 to 0.432 along
the average path. The decline in financial wealth is more substantial, falling
from 0 to -1.524 (or roughly three average individual annual incomes) along
9Speculation is trading activity that is motivated by differences in beliefs and would
be absent had all agents had the same beliefs.
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Figure 2: Actual vs perceived sample paths of consumption and financial
wealth of a type-2 agent in the complete markets economy.
Parameters: β = 0.96, el = 1/3, eh = 2/3, p
0 = p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.55.
the average path.
Despite a decline in his consumption and financial wealth, a type-2 agent
believes that what happens to him is simply bad luck. Figure 2 demonstrates
the difference between actual and perceived outcomes. This figure plots
expected, from a point of view of type-2 agent, evolution of his consumption
and financial wealth in periods 51-100 assuming that during periods 0-50 he
followed the “average path.” Not surprisingly, he expects to prosper. This is
a manifestation of another result in Blume and Easley [2006] which applied to
our example shows that agent 2 believes that his consumption will converge
almost surely to the entire aggregate endowment:
lim sup
t→∞
cit(σ) = 1 P
ia.s.
Finally, we present welfare levels for the two types of agents in our ex-
ample. As a benchmark, we compute welfare in the complete markets econ-
omy when beliefs are homogeneous and coincide with the truth. Assuming
p0 = 0.50, this benchmark level of welfare, denoted by W ∗, is −2 for each
type. Subjective welfare levels in the heterogeneous beliefs economy are
−1.943 and −2.124, respectively, for type-1 and type-2 agents. A type-1
agent, whose beliefs coincide with the truth, expects higher welfare than
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W ∗. He is better off in the economy with diverse beliefs as his “speculative”
financial trades allow him to accumulate wealth. A type-2 agent expects
welfare level that is lower than W ∗. This happens because the type-2 agent
believes that his endowment stream has a relatively low value. Objective
welfare levels (expected utility of equilibrium consumptions computed using
the truth) are −1.947 and −2.129, respectively for a type-1 and type-2 agent.
In this example, belief diversity has a substantial impact on welfare: rela-
tive to the common beliefs benchmark, a reduction in a type-2 agent’s welfare
is equivalent to a permanent 6.45% decline in his consumption.10 So welfare
of a type-2 agent is low, and hence according to the Rawlsian aggregator,
social welfare is low. Two sources contribute to this outcome: consumption
volatility and a downward trend in a type-2 agent’s consumption. To quan-
tify the contribution of each source, we note that the welfare of a type-2
agent computed along the “average path” is −2.091. Thus, low welfare of
a type-2 agent is caused largely by a diminishing trend in his consumption
rather than by increased consumption volatility.11
6.2 Bond economy
In the bond-only economy, agents can save or borrow by buying or selling
bonds, but they cannot transfer income across states. To insure that an
equilibrium exists, we impose a borrowing limit as explained in section 4.2.
Since it is impossible to devise a priori a borrowing limit that would never
bind, we impose an exogenous, yet generous, limit of 16 average individual
annual incomes: Bit(σ) = 8, ∀t, σ.
Continuing with the example from the previous section, we simulate equi-
librium consumption and wealth dynamics in the bond economy. As shown
in figure 3, consumption and financial wealth for the type-2 agent now grow
on average. Consumption increases from an average of 0.492 to 0.526 (panel
10Costs of aggregate fluctuations in a standard RBC model are typically found to be
below 0.1%.
11It is natural to ask what would happen in this economy if a type-2 agent were opti-
mistic. To answer this we studied the case with p0 = p1 = 0.50, p2 = 0.45. Welfare levels
in this case are: U1
P 0
= U1
P 1
= −2.002, U2
P 0
= −2.063 and U2
P 2
= −2.058. Here a type-2
agent still has the lower welfare in the economy, but it is not as low. This happens largely
because optimism increases the value of his endowment plan. So his consumption while
decreasing on average starts from a value above 0.5. If we replaced his consumption plan
with an average plan his welfare would be −2.024. So here the welfare loss is attributed
mainly to increased consumption volatility. See also section A.2.1.
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Figure 3: Sample paths of consumption and financial wealth of a type-2 agent
in the bond economy.
Parameters: β = 0.96, el = 1/3, eh = 2/3, p
0 = p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.55, B = 8.
A), and financial wealth rises from an average of 0 to 0.878, or 1.76 average
individual annual incomes (panel B). As explained in Cogley et al. [2014],
this occurs because the type-2 agent is pessimistic and buys bonds as a pre-
cautionary store of value.
Subjective welfare levels are −2.004 and −2.011, respectively, for the
type-1 and type-2 agents. So both agents expect to be worse off than in the
complete markets economy in which agents have common, correct beliefs.
Objective welfare levels show that despite accumulating financial wealth, a
type-2 agent has lower welfare. This occurs because pessimism motivates
a type-2 agent to postpone consumption far into the future, which lowers
expected utility.
6.3 Bond-only vs complete markets
If (p1 = p0 = 0.5, p2 = 0.55) were the only admissible beliefs, our welfare
criterion (with the Rawlsian aggregator) would select the bond-only design
over the complete markets design. The former awards a substantial welfare
level to both types because it limits speculation while still allowing resources
to be transferred across periods. Under complete markets, type-1 agents
take advantage of the poor forecasting abilities of type-2 agents, eventually
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driving them to destitution.
Matters are more complicated when we consider a larger set of admissible
beliefs. For instance, suppose (p1, p2) ∈ [0.45, 0.55]2, and p0 = 0.5.12 Figure
4 plots the welfare surface mini[UP 0(c
i(p1, p2|M))] for this belief set.13 The
lowest welfare level under the bond-only design is −2.011, and it is achieved
at (p1, p2) = (0.45, 0.45) and (0.55, 0.55). At these “critical points” (depicted
by black points in the figure), beliefs are homogeneous but wrong.
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Figure 4: Welfare in example 1: the bond-only (black) vs the complete
markets (gray) design. Square point denotes the unconstrained maximum:
(p1, p2,W ∗) = (0.5, 0.5,−2). Circle points denote belief assignments that
attain the lowest welfare under the corresponding design.
Parameters: β = 0.96, el = 1/3, eh = 2/3, p
0 = 0.5, B = 8.
The lowest welfare in the complete markets economy is −2.139, and it is
achieved at (p1, p2) = (0.45, 0.525) and (0.475, 0.55) (portrayed by gray points
in the figure). At the critical points, beliefs are nearly maximally different.
Consider the belief assignment (p1, p2) = (0.45, 0.525). With these beliefs the
12Note that for now, we consider only one possible true data generating process. In
section 8, we relax this restriction.
13The shape of this welfare surface is explained in Appendix A.2.
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type-1 agent has lower welfare. Two forces act against him. First, his beliefs
are less accurate, so his consumption is eventually driven to zero. Second, he
is more pessimistic than a type-2 agent, and his endowment stream is valued
less – he is subject to a negative wealth effect. But a type-2 agent is also
pessimistic, and this activates a wealth effect that reduces a type-2 agent’s
welfare.
In this example, our welfare criterion (using the Rawlsian aggregator)
selects the bond-only design over the complete markets design because:
−2.011 = min
P 1,P 2
min
i
U iP 0(c
i(P|B)) > min
P 1,P 2
min
i
U iP 0(c
i(P|CM)) = −2.139.
The complete markets design would be preferred if the set of admissible
beliefs were concentrated tightly enough about the truth, for example, if it
were reduced to [0.49, 0.51]2.
This is not surprising as the complete markets design is, of course, pre-
ferred to the bond-only design with common, correct beliefs. It is surprising,
though, that the bond-only design performs so robustly, at least when there
is no aggregate risk.
Before we continue with our next market design we would like to describe
the choice made by a designer who is guided by the true-Pareto welfare crite-
rion. Figure 5 plots the set of beliefs for which the bond-only market design
true-Pareto dominates complete markets. The dark gray area denotes belief
assignments for which the bond-only CE allocation true-Pareto dominates the
complete markets CE allocation. Naturally, this occurs where disagreement
is strongest. As explained above, restricting financial trade to risk-free bonds
effectively shuts down speculation, thereby increasing everyone’s utility. The
portion of the region at the bottom right corner is larger than at the top left
corner. This is because these beliefs make agents optimistic and more willing
to speculate. Hence, in our example, regulation is desirable over a larger set
of parameters when agents are optimistic. The light gray area denotes belief
assignments under which the two market designs cannot be ranked because
one agent gains while another loses. It is useful to emphasize that this area is
more than 50% of the whole set of beliefs. It shrinks dramatically when the
truth is varied. The white area denotes belief assignments under which the
complete markets dominate the bond-only design. This area includes beliefs
that coincide with or are close to the truth. It also includes a narrow area
parallel to the “agreement diagonal.” In this portion of the parameter space,
the effect of disagreement is offset by the bias in beliefs towards one of the
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states. To illustrate, consider point (p1, p2) = (0.475, 0.450). At this point
agent 1 is closer to the truth and he is rewarded in financial markets that are
unregulated. However, beliefs are stacked against him as both agents believe
that he is relatively unlikely to receive high endowment. These two effects
happen to offset each other leaving both agents relatively well off.
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Figure 5: True-Pareto ranking: B ≻ CM (dark gray), CM ≻ B (white),
allocations cannot be ranked (light gray).
Parameters: β = 0.96, el = 1/3, eh = 2/3, p
0 = 0.5, B = 1.
6.4 Borrowing limits
We continue to assume that p0 = 0.50 and that the admissible set of belief
assignments is (p1, p2) ∈ [0.45, 0.55]2. We impose a borrowing limit B = 1,
equivalent to two average individual annual incomes. Figure 6 shows the
social welfare surface for this environment (black) and contrasts it with the
benchmark complete markets design (gray).
The square depicts the maximum achievable welfare in the two economies.
It is reached at (p1, p2) = (0.5, 0.5) in both cases and is equal to W ∗ = −2.
When agents agree, there is little trading and borrowing limits are slack.
The two circles portray the minimum welfare achieved under the re-
spective market designs. Under the design with borrowing limits, the low-
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Figure 6: Welfare in example 2: the complete markets with borrowing limits
(black) vs the complete markets design (gray). Square point denotes the
unconstrained maximum: (p1, p2,W ∗) = (0.5, 0.5,−2). Circles denote belief
assignments that attain the lowest welfare under the corresponding design.
Parameters: β = 0.96, el = 1/3, eh = 2/3, p
0 = 0.5, B = 1.
est welfare levels are achieved at either (p1, p2) = (0.45, 0.48) or (p1, p2 =
(0.53, 0.55). As in the bond economy, belief heterogeneity ceases to be the
critical force defining the lowest welfare in the economy. Instead, at the crit-
ical belief assignments, agents nearly agree on one of the types being poor.
For example, at the point (p1, p2) = (0.45, 0.48), everyone agrees that a type-
1 agent is less likely to receive high endowments. Moreover, a type-1 agent’s
beliefs are less accurate. For both reasons, his and the society’s welfare is
lower. At (p1, p2) = (0.53, 0.55) it is a type-2 agent who suffers. Tightening
the borrowing limit significantly lessens speculation and attenuates survival
forces. For this example, society’s welfare increases from -2.139 to -2.083, a
difference equivalent to a 2.7% permanent increase in consumption.
Next we turn to an economy in which the type-1 agent knows the truth
and the type-2 agent is pessimistic, (p1, p2) = (0.50, 0.55). We compute
means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the following variables:
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type-2 agent’s financial wealth a2t (σ), his consumption c
2
t (σ) and prices of a
risk-free bond qbt (σ) and a claim to the aggregate endowment q
e
t (σ) (see (4) for
a definition).14 We contrast two designs: complete markets with (restrictive)
B = 1 and (relaxed) B = 8 borrowing limits. Table 1 summarizes our
findings. First, financial wealth of the type-2 agent is 3.79 times less volatile
under B = 1 than under B = 8. Second, consumption of the type-2 agent
stays closer to 0.5 and it is also 2.43 times less volatile than under B = 8.
A more nearly equal and less volatile distribution of consumption is the
source of welfare gains in the design with the tight borrowing limit. Third,
prices of the two financial assets are increased and also more volatile. That
is, by tightening the borrowing limit the designer drives volatility out of
consumption and into prices. This outcome illustrates that a goal of financial
price stability may conflict with social welfare maximization.
a2 c2 ln(qb) ln(qe)
B = 1 -0.135 0.483 -0.037 3.275
(0.612) (0.038) (0.008) (0.030)
B = 8 -5.248 0.284 -0.041 3.182
(2.317) (0.092) (0.002) (0.022)
Table 1: Mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) for the complete
markets with borrowing limit design
6.5 Transaction tax
Figure 7 shows welfare for our example under three market designs: complete
markets with a natural borrowing limit, complete markets with an exogenous
borrowing limit B = 8, and complete markets with B = 8 plus a transac-
tion tax τ = 0.05.15 Welfare levels for the first two designs are very close,
suggesting that competitive equilibrium allocations under B = 8 are close
to allocations under the natural borrowing limits. Imposing a transaction
tax on top of the borrowing limit increases society’s welfare from -2.134 to
-2.079, an amount equivalent to a permanent 2.6% increase in consumption.
14We simulated 11,000 periods starting from a random state and (a1
0
, a2
0
) = (0, 0). We
discarded the first 1,000 observations.
15The natural borrowing limits are difficult to compute in the presence of a transaction
cost. So, a generous exogenous borrowing limit is imposed instead.
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Figure 7: Welfare in example 3: complete markets with borrowing limits and
transaction tax (black) vs complete markets with borrowing limit (dark gray)
vs complete markets. Square point denotes the unconstrained maximum:
(p1, p2,W ) = (0.5, 0.5,−2). Circle points denote belief assignments that
attain the lowest welfare under the corresponding market design.
Parameters: β = 0.96, el = 1/3, eh = 2/3, p
0 = 0.5, B = 8, τ = 0.05.
7 Bergson-Samuelson criterion
Next, we examine an alternative utility aggregator that makes use of indi-
viduals’ “market weights.” This means that for any belief assignment P we
first solve for the competitive equilibrium. Then we compute the vector of
Pareto weights for which the competitive and the Pareto allocations coincide.
Let θi(P) denote the implied Pareto weight, which we also call the market
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weight, of type-i agent.16 The corresponding social welfare function is:
min
P 0∈B0
min
P∈BI
I∑
i=1
θiUi,P 0(c
i(P|M)).
The social welfare criterion with this utility aggregator replaces the lowest
welfare in the society with a particular weighted average of individual welfare
levels. Under this criterion, the social welfare of an allocation cannot be
driven by a small but disadvantaged group because its Pareto weight would,
in general, be small. Nevertheless, using this aggregator we obtain qualitative
results that are similar to those derived using the Rawlsian criterion.
Figure 8 plots the welfare weight of agent 2 for (p1, p2) ∈ [0.45, 0.55]2 ≡ B.
The weights of the two types sum to one. The weight equals 0.5 on the di-
agonal where agents are symmetric opposites: p1 = 1 − p2. Consider now
moving away from the diagonal towards (p1, p2) = (0.45, 0.45). Agent 2 be-
comes more optimistic and agent 1 more pessimistic; so a type-2 agent’s
weight increases and a type-1 agent’s weight decreases. This occurs because
prices reflect the common belief that type 2 is more likely to receive high en-
dowment. So the type 2 agent is wealthier and his market weight is higher.17
We now compare welfares of the bond-only economy and the complete
markets economy. We continue to fix p0 = 0.5. Figure 9 plots social welfare∑
i[θ
i(P)UP 0(ci(P|M))] for the two financial markets designs. When beliefs
coincide with the truth, p1 = p2 = p0, the welfare of each type agent is
-2 – the maximum achievable under any market design (depicted by the
gray square point). Social welfare is close to this benchmark when agents
have common beliefs, even if those beliefs are wrong, i.e., on the diagonal
with p1 = p2. Close to the diagonal, welfare under the bond-only design
and under the complete markets design are similar. But the latter is higher
because disagreement is small and survival forces are weak. So while agents
are driven out of financial markets, this occurs slowly.
As we move away from the common beliefs diagonal, social welfare stays
robustly high under the bond-only design, but declines under the complete
16With logarithmic preferences Pareto weights are date-0 wealth shares so the weight
of agent i is the proportion of the aggregate wealth owned by him. This suggests yet
another possibility, namely, to use wealth shares from the complete markets competitive
equilibrium.
17This is a manifestation of the wealth effect that may sometimes dominate sur-
vival/speculative forces.
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Figure 8: Implied Pareto weight of the type-2 agent θ2 for the complete
markets economy.
Parameters: β = 0.96, el = 1/3, eh = 2/3, p
0 = 0.5.
markets design. The reason for the robust performance of the bond-only
design is that it limits survival forces. That is, differences in beliefs have
only a limited effect on the equilibrium outcome when only a risk-free bond
is traded. The lowest welfare under the bond-only design is achieved at
(p1, p2) = (0.55, 0.55) and (p1, p2) = (0.45, 0.45). At these belief assignments,
both types incorrectly believe that one of them is more likely to receive a
high endowment. As the common belief is reflected in the bond price, the
believed-to-be-poor type turns out to be poor in fact. So social welfare
is low because the discrepancy between agents’ individual welfare levels is
large. The lowest welfare under the complete markets design is achieved at
(p1, p2) = (0.45, 0.55) and (p1, p2) = (0.55, 0.45) (depicted by gray circles
in the figure). At these points beliefs are maximally heterogeneous. So
speculative motives are strong and survival forces occasionally drive each
agent arbitrarily close to losing all of his wealth. As a result, consumption
is volatile and social welfare is low. We conclude that for this example the
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bond-only design dominates the complete markets design:
−2.132 = minP
I∑
i=1
θiU iP 0(P|CM) < minP
I∑
i=1
θiU iP 0(P|B) = −2.011.
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Figure 9: Welfare in example 1: the bond-only (black) vs the complete
markets (gray) design. Square point denotes the unconstrained maximum:
(p1, p2,W ∗) = (0.5, 0.5,−2). Circle points denote belief assignments that
attain the lowest welfare under the corresponding design.
Parameters: β = 0.96, el = 1/3, eh = 2/3, p
0 = 0.5, B = 8.
We next compare the complete markets economy with borrowing lim-
its and the unrestricted complete markets design. Figure 10 plots welfare
surfaces corresponding to the two designs. We impose a borrowing limit of
B = 1 or two average annual incomes. This limit is restrictive compared
with the natural borrowing limits, but it would not bind in a competitive
equilibrium with complete markets if both agents had correct beliefs. With
diverse beliefs, on the other hand, any tight exogenous borrowing limit must
be binding. Moreover, any borrowing limit is more restrictive when agents
30
0.46
0.48
0.50
0.52
0.54
Belief p1
0.46
0.48
0.50
0.52
0.54
Belief p2
-2.16
-2.14
-2.12
-2.10
-2.08
-2.06
-2.04
-2.02
-2.00
-1.98
W
el
fa
re
, m
in
(U
1 ,
U
2 )
Figure 10: Welfare in example 2: the complete markets with borrowing limits
(black) vs the complete markets design (gray). Square point denotes the
unconstrained maximum: (p1, p2,W ∗) = (0.5, 0.5,−2). Circles denote belief
assignments that attain the lowest welfare under the corresponding design.
Parameters: β = 0.96, el = 1/3, eh = 2/3, p
0 = 0.5, B = 1.
are pessimistic than when they are optimistic.18 For this reason, the worst
belief assignment is (0.45, 0.55) – when disagreement is maximal and both
types of agent are pessimistic. A tight borrowing limit restricts the maximal
amount of wealth that can be lost by any agent and bounds consumption
away from zero. Yet borrowing limits are attained only when wealth be-
comes unevenly distributed. When disagreement is small, wealth is always
close to being equally distributed so borrowing limits rarely bind. For this
reason, the two market designs deliver similar welfare levels when disagree-
ment is small in which case imposing even the tight borrowing limit B = 1
is nearly inconsequential. We conclude that the design with the borrowing
18This occurs because insurance and speculative motives align and prompt both types
to purchase more Arrow securities for the low income state as in Tsyrennikov [2012].
31
limit B = 1 dominates the design with natural borrowing limits:
−2.132 = minP
I∑
i=1
θiU iP 0(P|CMT) < minP
I∑
i=1
θiU iP 0(P|CMB) = −2.028.
Finally, we analyze the effect of a transaction tax on each financial trans-
action as specified in (7). This tax limits speculation, but it also restricts
hedging possibilities. As above, the new friction matters more when agents
are pessimistic. So the worst belief assignment under both designs is (p1, p2) =
(0.45, 0.55); see figure 11. Welfare is lowest in this case because 1) survival
forces are strongest, and 2) agents’ pessimism prompts agents to trade/hedge
more actively, making the transaction tax harmful. Nonetheless, imposing
a transaction tax of κ = 0.05 increases social welfare relative to complete
markets:
−2.118 = minP
I∑
i=1
θiU iP 0(P|CM) < minP
I∑
i=1
θiU iP 0(P|CMB) = −2.049.
8 Dependence on P 0
Our welfare criterion uses three min operators. But so far we have demon-
strated the use of the criterion only for a singleton B0. In this section, we
confront our designer with multiple data-generating processes: |B0| > 1. Re-
call that our theoretical results hold for any P 0 and, hence, for any B0. Our
numerical examples also show that welfare varies more under the complete
markets design than under the designs with financial restrictions. By in-
troducing ambiguity about P 0 via expansion of B0, we expect welfare gains
from financial restrictions to increase. These expectations are confirmed by
the results reported in table 2. Here our welfare criterion uses the Rawlsian
aggregator.19
In constructing Table 2, we have assumed that (p1, p2) ∈ [0.45, 0.55]2.
That is, for each choice of p0 ∈ [0.45, 0.50] we report minP 1,P 2 miniW iP 0(ci(P|·)).20
19We use the following notation: WP 0(M) = minP 1,P 2 mini U iP 0(ci|M).
20The results for p0 ∈ [0.50, 0.55] are symmetric. So both at p0 = 0.55 and at p0 = 0.45
we get W (CMB) = −2.171,W (CM) = −2.545. Only the identity of the less well-off agent
changes.
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Figure 11: Welfare in example 3: complete markets with borrowing lim-
its and transaction tax (black) vs complete markets with borrowing limit
(gray). Square point denotes the unconstrained maximum: (p1, p2,W ) =
(0.5, 0.5,−2). Circle points denote belief assignments that attain the lowest
welfare under the corresponding market design.
Parameters: β = 0.96, el = 1/3, eh = 2/3, p
0 = 0.5, B = 8, τ = 0.05.
Columns 2 through 5 present welfare under the unrestricted complete markets
design (section 4.1), the bond economy (section 4.2), complete markets with
borrowing limits (section 6.4), and complete markets with transaction tax
(section 6.5) respectively. All of these financial designs achieve the lowest wel-
fare at p0 = 0.45. Welfare under the complete markets is W (CM) = −2.545,
the lowest among our financial designs.
The best performing design is the bond-only economy that achieves wel-
fare level W (B) = −2.084. It offers an improvement over the complete mar-
kets design equivalent to a permanent 22.1% increase in consumption. The
design with borrowing limit B = 1 dominates the design with transaction
tax τ = 0.05: W (CMB) = −2.121 > −2.234 = W (CMT). The former offers
substantial improvement over the complete markets design, equivalent to a
permanent 20.0% increase in consumption. But it under performs relative to
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P 0 WP 0(CM) WP 0(B) WP 0(CMB) WP 0(CMT)
B = 8 B = 1 B = 8, τ = 5%
1 2 3 4 5
0.45 -2.545 -2.084 -2.121 -2.234
0.46 -2.439 -2.068 -2.113 -2.193
0.47 -2.347 -2.053 -2.106 -2.154
0.48 -2.267 -2.039 -2.098 -2.117
0.49 -2.195 -2.025 -2.090 -2.094
0.50 -2.139 -2.011 -2.083 -2.079
Table 2: Welfare level under different P 0: the designs with financial restric-
tions (B,CMB,CMT ) vs the complete markets design (CM).
Parameters: β = 0.96, el = 1/3, eh = 2/3, p
0 = 0.5.
the bond-only design. The design with a transaction tax does not perform
well when p0 6= 0.5. This happens because as p0 diverges from 0.5 agents
must take larger financial positions to hedge income fluctuations. These are
costly due to the transaction tax.21
The worst-case beliefs assignment for the complete markets design is
(p0, p1, p2) = (0.45, 0.45, 0.55). This point assigns correct beliefs to type-1
agents and maximally wrong beliefs to type-2 agents. This worst-case choice
of beliefs maximizes the strength of survival forces. Type-2 agents have
the lowest welfare. For the bond-only design. the worst-case assignment of
beliefs is (p0, p1, p2) = (0.45, 0.55, 0.535). Type-1 agents have the lowest wel-
fare. Under this belief assignment, type-1 agents wrongly believe that they
are more likely to receive a high endowment. So they dis-save and end up
consuming less than type-2 agents. In addition, type-1 agents have less ac-
curate beliefs that guide them to worse financial decisions. But because the
bond return adjusts and because there are limited speculation opportunities,
type-1 agents lose wealth very slowly. This makes the bond-only economy
a substantially more robust design than the complete markets. Under com-
21To build intuition, consider the case with correct and homogeneous beliefs. Recall
that in the initial state, z = 0, both agents receive the same income 0.5. When p0 = 0.5
agents trade to reallocate income across states. When p0 6= 0.5 agents get an additional
motive to trade: to reallocate income across time. This motive appears because expected
individual income is no longer 0.5 and agents want to borrow or lend against the future
income. Because trading is costly, agents end up with ‘suboptimal’ positions. See also
derivations in section 6.
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plete markets with a borrowing limit, the worst-case assignment of beliefs
is (p0, p1, p2) = (0.45, 0.515, 0.55). Type-2 agents have the lowest welfare,
first, because their beliefs are less accurate and, second, because both types
agree that type-2 agents are less likely to receive a high endowment. This
forces type-2 agents to stay close to a restrictive borrowing limit. However,
unlike outcomes under the complete markets design, the strict borrowing
limit B = 1 allows type-2 agents to rebuild their financial wealth quickly.
Under complete markets with a transaction tax, the worst-case assignment
of beliefs is (p0, p1, p2) = (0.45, 0.45, 0.55). Type-2 agents have the lowest
welfare. This design is better than complete markets because a transaction
tax limits speculation. But a transaction tax also limits the speed of type-2
agent’s recovery once he runs into financial trouble. This makes the design
with a transaction tax worse than the other restrictions.
The larger B0 and B, the starker are the welfare differences. Reasonable
choices of B0 and B can be constructed using error detection probabilities as
in Hansen and Sargent [2007].22
8.1 Putting our welfare criterion to work
A benefit of our welfare criterion is that it can be immediately applied to
determine optimal financial market restrictions. As an example, we demon-
strate how to compute an optimal borrowing limit.23 Consider the complete
markets financial design with borrowing limits. Previously we imposed an
exogenous borrowing limit B = 1. We now compute the optimal borrowing
limit:
B∗ = argmax
B
min
P 1,P 2,P 0
min
i
W iP 0(CMB). (15)
In our example, the optimal borrowing limit B∗ is 36% of an average annual
income. In the economy with homogeneous beliefs, agents would borrow 33%
of an average annual income.24 So the optimal borrowing limit is just over
what is needed to hedge income fluctuations.
22This approach allows forming a set of models that are reasonably hard to distinguish
using a log-likelihood ratio test and a finite data sample.
23The magnitudes computed in this example are meant only as an illustration of how to
apply our welfare criterion. Serious policy proposals would need a more realistic model.
24This is not the natural borrowing limit but an equilibrium borrowing amount.
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9 Concluding remarks
We propose a framework and a welfare criterion for evaluation of different
financial market designs. Our setting is an endowment economy in which
agents may hold heterogeneous beliefs. We imagine a social planner who
chooses a financial market design to maximize social welfare before beliefs
and the true data generating process are assigned.
We use our criterion to study a simple economy. Our analysis illustrates
the trade-offs between welfare-reducing speculation and welfare-improving
insurance possibilities. Complete financial markets allow maximal insurance
possibilities, but for economies with heterogeneous beliefs they also allow
social welfare reducing speculation. We find that in the economies that we
study, financial market designs with simple restrictions like limits on the set
of traded assets, borrowing limits, and transaction taxes offer substantial
welfare gains relative to a complete financial markets benchmark. In our
examples, gains can be as large as those stemming from a 6% permanent
increase in consumption.
Our simulations do not allow for the possibility of traders who learn
the truth, but the analysis of learning in Blume and Easley [2006] suggests
that the story would not be much changed. They find that among Bayesian
learners, those selecting across a countable set of models containing the true
model do not vanish. In the more interesting case of individuals selecting
across a space of models of dimension at least 2, those selecting across a
given model space vanish in the presence of individuals selecting across a
lower-dimensional set. Some learners learn faster than others, and the slow
learners do not learn quickly enough to keep their consumption from becom-
ing negligible. And finally, in the presence of any learners, individuals who
do not learn disappear. Here too, limiting the bets that traders can take
slows down or prevents financial ruin of slow learners.
We believe that the most important limitation of our analysis is the ab-
sence of incentive effects. That is, in our analysis restrictions imposed on the
financial markets have no effects on the set of feasible allocations. Relaxing
this feature is arguably the most profitable direction for future research in
this line of work.
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A Appendix
A.1 Beliefs
As much of our analysis deals with beliefs and their correctness it is impor-
tant to be aware of the foundations for our ability to theorize about individ-
uals’ beliefs. This foundation is Savage’s (1954) subjective expected utility
representation theorem that delivers for each preference order satisfying his
axioms a payoff function and a probability vector that together generate an
additively separable representation over state-contingent payoffs. Although
Savage’s theorem does not compel any particular interpretation, economists
and game theorists typically take the payoff function as representing tastes,
such as attitudes towards risk, and the probability distribution as represent-
ing beliefs.
The argument that one can extract beliefs from preferences depends crit-
ically on the supposed uniqueness of the probability distribution in Savage’s
representation theorem. Unfortunately, uniqueness requires an assumption
about the representation that cannot be verified by observed choice behavior
alone. Suppose that a preference order for acts mapping states s ∈ S to
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outcomes y ∈ Y has an expected utility representation: a payoff function
u : Y → R and a probability distribution p on S. The uniqueness theorem
states that if v and q combine to give another expected utility representa-
tion of the same preference, then v is a positive affine transformation of u
and q equals p. This result, however, is limited to state-independent payoff
representations (not state-independent preferences, but a restriction to rep-
resentations that are state-independent).25 Savage’s axioms include a “state-
independence” assumption, that preferences conditional on two distinct non-
null states are identical. This allows the possibility of a state-independent
payoff function, but it does not rule out state-dependent payoffs. Together
with the other axioms, the only requirement it imposes on v : S × Y → R
is that the function v(s′, · ) : Y → R is a positive affine transformation of
v(s, · ) : Y → R (whenever s and s′ are both non-null).
Interpreting probabilities in expected utility representations as likelihood
assessments requires uniqueness of the probability distribution in the larger
class of state-dependent expected utility representations. Pinning the posi-
tive affine transformations down to translations is the necessary condition for
deriving uniqueness, but this requires an extension to the structure of prefer-
ences that is not revealed in choice behavior.26 If one insists that individual
preferences have expected utility representations, then the commitment that
individuals have identical beliefs can only be justified by non-choice consid-
erations even when individual preferences can be represented by (perhaps
different) state-independent payoff functions and a common probability dis-
tribution.
A.2 Complete markets design
In this section we explain the shape of the welfare surface under the complete
markets design. Two forces are key to understanding this surface. The first
is the survival force: the type of agent with the least accurate beliefs has his
wealth drift downward and likely to have the lowest welfare. The second is
the wealth effect: an equilibrium price system is affected by the configuration
25If we allow that tastes can depend upon states, so that payoff functions can map S×Y
into R, then the only thing unique about the probability distribution is its support. For
any q with support identical to p, there is a state-dependent payoff function v such that v
and q combine to represent the preferences.
26See Karni and Schmeidler [1993] and Karni and Mongin [2000].
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of beliefs and this may present an advantage to one of the types.27
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Figure 12: Welfare in example 1 under the complete markets design
(gray). Square point denotes the unconstrained maximum: (p1, p2,W ) =
(0.5, 0.5,−2). Circle points denote belief assignments that attain the lowest
welfare.
Parameters: β = 0.96, el = 1/3, eh = 2/3, p
0 = 0.5.
Figure 12 reproduces the welfare surface shown in figure 4. Along arc
AOB both types are either optimistic or both pessimistic. The wealth effects
for each type offset each other. So welfare is decreasing as we move away
from point O because agents disagree more on individual states and accept
more volatile consumption. When we perturb beliefs slightly away from the
arc, welfare drops. This happens because of the wealth effect. Independently
of the direction in which beliefs are perturbed, one type’s wealth will be
affected negatively, and this reduces both his and society’s welfare.
Along arc CD both types are close to agreement, but p1 > p2. Consider
the closer half of arc CD where p2 > 0.5. Then a type-1 agent is optimistic
27When beliefs are equally accurate, the direction can be determined by looking at the
date-0 consumption level. If the wealth effect impacts both types equally then ci
0
= 0.5.
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and a type-2 agent is pessimistic. This configuration of beliefs is advanta-
geous to a type-1 agent. (See also our two period example below.) But a
type-1 agent also has less accurate beliefs. So he is affected adversely by
survival forces. The latter partially offsets the wealth effect and creates a
ridge along arc CD.28
A.2.1 Wealth effect
It is instructive to study a simple two-period economy. This example demon-
strates that an agent with less accurate beliefs can secure a higher objective
welfare. The key to this result is a wealth effect.
The period utility function is u(c) = log(c), and future utility is not
discounted. The state in period 0 is known, and there are two possible state
realizations in period 1. Endowments for the two types are (0.5, 0.5) in period
0. In period 1, they are (1, 0) when the state is 1 and (0, 1) when the state
is 2. Under the true probability distribution, both states are equally likely.
A type-1 agent’s beliefs coincide with the truth. But a type-2 agent believes
that prob(s = 1) = 0.5(1−∆) 6= 0.5. Depending on whether ∆ > 0 or ∆ < 0
a type-2 agent is optimistic or pessimistic.
If both types had correct beliefs, in a competitive equilibrium allocation
with complete markets, every agent would consume 0.5 in every period and
state.
When markets are complete, the optimal consumption plan of a type-2
agent is:
c20 =
1
2−∆ , c
2
1(s = 1) =
1 + 2∆
2 +∆
, c21(s = 2) =
1− 2∆
2− 3∆ . (16)
Two aspects of this equilibrium are important. First, consumption of agent
2 is decreasing on average for all ∆ 6= 0:
E[c21] = c
2
0
4− 4∆2c20
4−∆2(c20)2
< c20. (17)
Here the agent with incorrect beliefs is gradually being ”driven from the mar-
ket.” Second, if a type-2 agent is optimistic (∆ < 0), then his consumption
in period 0 is higher than 0.5. Lastly, the agent with incorrect beliefs may
28Along the more distant half of arc CD, the roles of the two types reverse.
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Figure 13: Objective welfare in the two-period complete markets economy
have higher objective welfare:
dW 2(∆)
d∆
∣∣∣
∆=0
= 1 6= 0, (18)
where W 2(∆) ≡ ln(c20) + 0.5ln(c21(s = 1)) + 0.5ln(c21(s = 2)). Here agent 2
can be better off being an optimist. But limp→0.5W
2(p) = −∞. Figure 13
plots welfare of the two types of agent. The horizontal dotted line denotes the
welfare level in the economy in which beliefs of each agent coincide with the
truth. A type-2 agent benefits from being optimistic because of his impact
on the equilibrium price system. Optimism increases the relative price of
goods delivered in state s = 2. This is the wealth effect.
A.3 On choice of preference specification
We made two important assumptions about individual preferences. The first
is that preferences are time separable and the second is that the period utility
function is unbounded below. Neither is crucial for our analysis.
Suppose that individual preferences have a recursive utility representation
as in Epstein and Zin [1989]. When markets are complete and agents have
diverse beliefs, some agent types will be driven out of financial markets. The
difference is, as Borovicka [2012] shows, that it may not be the agent with
the most accurate beliefs who survives as in Blume and Easley [2006]. But
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so long as there are agents that could be driven out of financial markets,
there is a case for financial regulation. Our arguments could be regarded as
becoming more compelling in this case because speculation may impoverish
agents with more accurate beliefs.
When the period utility function is bounded from below, survival forces
could be stronger because potential financial losses have lower utility cost.
We demonstrate this by changing the period utility specification to u(c) =√
c. Figure 14 plots welfare surfaces for the complete markets design and
the complete markets with an exogenous borrowing limit design. Welfare
levels under the two financial designs are, respectively, 1.3033 and 1.3762,
a difference equivalent to a permanent 5.59% increase in consumption. The
welfare effect of imposing the borrowing limit B = 1 is less significant than
with u(c) = −1/c, but the set of beliefs for which the complete markets design
is preferred is smaller. Although survival forces are stronger and agents can
lose financial wealth more quickly, the welfare effect of losing wealth is less
significant.
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Figure 14: Welfare with bounded below utility for complete markets (gray)
and complete markets with a tight borrowing limit (black).
Parameters: β = 0.96, el = 1/3, eh = 2/3, p
0 = p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.55, B = 8.
43
A.3.1 Effects of time preference
The choice of financial design also depends on the discount factor β. To
illustrate the effect of time preference, we fix p1 = p0 = 0.5 and specify the
admissible belief set as p2 ∈ [0.45, 0.55]. Then we let the common discount
factor β vary between 0.8 and 0.99. Figure 15 plots the social welfare sur-
face (again using the Rawlsian aggregator) under the bond-only (black) and
complete markets (gray) designs.29
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Figure 15: Welfare in example 1: the bond-only (black) vs the complete
markets (gray) design. Circle points denote belief assignments that attain
the lowest welfare under the corresponding design when β = 0.99.
Parameters: el = 1/3, eh = 2/3, p
0 = p1 = 0.5, B = 2.
As the discount factor increases, the minimum welfare in the bond econ-
omy dominates the complete markets economy on a larger set of belief speci-
fications. This happens because agents care more about the limiting behavior
of their consumption plans when they are more patient. So, their welfare can
29Note that the borrowing limit under the bond-only design was tightened so that we
could study preferences with a discount factor as low as 0.8.
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be low even when disagreement is small under the complete markets design.30
For instance, for β = 0.99, social welfare is -2.637 and -2.008, respectively,
under the complete markets and the bond-only designs. In this case, restrict-
ing financial markets to allow trade of only a risk-free bond is equivalent to
a permanent 31.3% increase in consumption.
30Roughly speaking disagreement affects the speed at which an agent with less accurate
beliefs can lose wealth. So, more patient agents care about longer horizons and they can
loose substantial amounts of wealth over long periods of time even if they are losing slowly.
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